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Abstract: The conflict between individual interests and good common is present in many differ-
ent situations on living systems. How cooperation emerges it is very important to understand how
behaves a lot of systems, as a city, a society or even an ecosystem. In this work we had purposed to
have a look on how humans face this kind of situations. By analyzing the data of a social experiment,
where 541 individuals played a social dilemma, we found that the actions of the people are influenced
by the actions of their rivals, and this leads to a specific behaviour of the population. We expect
that this work is going to help us to understand how cooperation emerges between individuals, and
have a better approach to understanding the rules that obey the human societies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex systems[1] are defined by these systems
formed by a set of agents, or parts that interact among
them. A few examples of this are a city, a cell, an ant
colony, a brain, a bunch of spins... and so on. In this kind
of systems the characteristics of the interactions between
the parts is at least as important as the characteristics
of the agents. That is because from the interactions can
arise properties of the whole system, called commonly
as emergent properties[2]. In some of these systems
the interactions are physical, like the electromagnetic
interaction between water molecules (that leads to the
emergent phenomena of the surface tension), but in so
many other systems, like an ecosystem or a society, the
nature of the interactions between agents it’s better
represented with tools provided by the game theory.
Game theory[3] it is a branch of mathematics that
studies the strategies and rules of the games.
One of the most popular games of the game theory
is the prisoner’s dilemma[4], in wich two players can
choose between cooperation or defection. If both players
cooperate both of them receive the same amount of
reward R, but if one of them defects the defector gets
a bigger reward T, and the cooperators get a smaller
reward S. If both players choose to defect the both
receive an intermediate reward P. In the prisoner’s
dilemma the reward parameters are always arranged
with the following order: T > R > P > S. But the
parameters P, R, S and T can be sorted in different
ways, and then the game receive different names.
These games are a very interesting case of study since
it contains the essence of the dilemma between good
common and self interests, present in so many different
scenarios, ranging from politics and economics to ecol-
ogy. One example of a situation that is well represented
with this kind of games is two competing companies that
sell the same product. If both companies sell the product
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at the same price by mutual agreement we can say that
both of them cooperate, but if one of them lowers the
price more people are going to buy to them, with more
reward for the defector company. Another example is
the apoptosis of the cells[5], where cells kill themselves
for the good common of the community. But if one cell
chooses to defect, that means that it does not produce
apoptosis, it lives more time, and gets more reward,
but that causes cancer, and in the worst scenario the
dead of all the other cells. Because all of this studying
the behaviour of different individuals playing at these
games can help us to understand the organization and
dynamics of different communities. So, in this work we
are going to analyze the results of a social experiment[6],
were 541 people from different ages, places and genders
played a game like the described previously. In this
experiment people played between 15 and 20 rounds,
every round with a different and unknown opponent,
and with different values for the parameters S and T.
P and R are always settled to 5 and 10 respectively.
In a previous work[7], from the analysis of the actions
of the people as a function of the parameters S and T,
it has been found that there are 5 different strategies,
or phenotypes (named as envious, trustful, optimist,
pessimist and clueless), and every people belongs to one
of these five phenotypes.
On the following sections we are going to see some
patterns on the interactions between players, and build
up a mathematical model to explain some of the global
properties of our system. We will also make a computa-
tional simulation of our model, and compare it with the
data.
Figure 1. Actions as a function of S and T for the five
phenotypes. Image taked from [7]
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II. THEORY AND RESULTS
A. The interactions
In this section we are going to explain the results that
came up from the data analysis. But first we are going
to explain in a more accurate way the game of the exper-
iment. As we said, every participant of the experiment
played between 15 and 20 rounds, every round with some
different and unknown person. Before they could choose
the action (that is cooperate or defect), we showed them
the payment matrix (figure 1), where the columns are
the opponent action, and the rows the self action. The
S and T parameters varied randomly in every round, in
the ranges [0,10] and [5,15] respectively, and as we said P
and R was always settled to 5 and 10, respectively. The
people that participated at this experiment was rewarded
with a proportional amount of real money of what they
won during the game.
Figure 2. Payment matrix
It seems reasonable that if a person cooperates, but
their opponent defects, the first one on the next rounds
will be forewarned against the others intention, and he
will be more susceptible to defection. To check this what
we did was calculate, from the experiment data, the rate
of action changing after a round where the opponent gets
a bigger reward (Gg), the same reward (Gi), and less
reward (Gp), understanding action changing as different
actions at consecutive rounds (table I). We can see from
the table I that there’s no significant differences among
the three values of changing rate.
Gg Gi Gp
0.43± 0.03 0.42± 0.02 0.39± 0.03
TABLE I: Values of the Gg, Gi and Gp parameters. The
error interval, on all this paper, was calculated at 99 per cent
of confidence.
But, in every round the parameters S and T varies,
so the game conditions can be so different between two
consecutive rounds. So, we are going to consider that
every round belongs to one of five different game zones, in
function of the parameters S and T. This five game zones
are all the possible permutations among the parameters
R, P, S and T, and they are defined at equation (1). We
are also considering that the actions of the same player
are not correlated among different game zones (not a very
accurate assumption, since the optimist and pessimist
phenotypes have correlations among some of the game
zones that can’t be explained with our model, but in our
case of study it is useful). Please note that since we make
these considerations, at the game zones 1-4 the opponent
getting a bigger reward corresponds to the situation of
(C,D), where the C denotes the action of the subject,
and D the action of the opponent. At the game zone
5 the opponent getting a bigger reward corresponds to
the situation of (D,C). In general, for the game zones 1-
4 the parameters Gg, Gi and Gp are the rate of action
changing after a round at the situations (C,D), (C,C) or
(D,D), and (D,C) respectively. At the game zone 5 the
parameters Gg, Gi and Gp are the rate of action changing
after a round at the situations (D,C), (C,C) or (D,D), and
(C,D) respectively.
GameZone1 : S < P < T < R
GameZone2 : S < P < R < T
GameZone3 : P < S < R < T
GameZone4 : P < S < T < R
GameZone5 : P < T < S < R
(1)
After making this two considerations we can calculate a
new changing rate values, understanding now the chang-
ing rate as different actions in two consecutive rounds at
the same game. This results are shown at table II, for all
the players, and for every phenotype. Please note that
the trustful phenotype is the only one where Gp > Gg.
Also, at the table III are represented the values of Gg,
Gi and Gp for every game, and we can see that the differ-
ence Gg−Gp increases with the difference T −S (Figure
4).
Gg Gi Gp
All players 0.48± 0.04 0.28± 0.02 0.25± 0.03
Optimists 0.45± 0.07 0.30± 0.04 0.31± 0.08
Pessimists 0.57± 0.08 0.30± 0.04 0.34± 0.08
Envious 0.76± 0.09 0.18± 0.03 0.12± 0.03
Trustful 0.26± 0.06 0.31± 0.05 0.63± 0.13
Clueles 0.60± 0.10 0.42± 0.06 0.34± 0.09
TABLE II: Values of the Gg, Gi and Gp parameters for the
different phenotypes.
Game zone Gg Gi Gp
1 0.42± 0.06 0.37± 0.04 0.31± 0.05
2 0.54± 0.07 0.22± 0.04 0.18± 0.05
3 0.46± 0.08 0.37± 0.05 0.25± 0.07
4 0.37± 0.15 0.30± 0.10 0.35± 0.15
5 0.03± 0.06 0.13± 0.03 0.66± 0.12
TABLE III: Values of the Gg, Gi and Gp parameters for the
different game zones.
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Figure 4. Gg - Gp vs. T - S.
B. Theoretical analysis
We are going to make in this section a theoretical anal-
ysis of the behaviour of the whole system, modeling the
whole population as a dynamic system. First of all we’ll
suppose that every player have the same values of Gg, Gi
and Gp, being these three values parameters of our sys-
tem. We are also considering that the number of players
tends to infinite, so we avoid statistical fluctuations, and
in every round the opponent are selected randomly. Since
we make this assumptions the probabilities of change the
action for one player are:
pC→ D = fGi + (1− f)Gg
pD→ C = fGp + (1− f)Gi (2)
Where f are the fraction of the population that chose
to cooperate. Please note that this analysis are only valid
for the game zones 1-4 (to get the same analysis at the
game zone 5 you just have to exchange Gg for Gp). Also
we can get the difference of f between two consecutive
rounds, as we can see at equation (3):
∆f = ft+1 − ft = −ftpC→ D + (1− ft)pD→ C (3)
Substituting the equations (2) at the equation (3), re-
ordering terms, and defining B = Gg−Gp (except at the
game zone 5, where B = Gp − Gg) we get the following
dynamic system:
∆ft+1 = Bft + (1−B − 2Gi)ft +Gi (4)
We can find the fixed pints of our dinamic system im-
posing ft+1 = ft, and we get the equation (5):
∆f =





Where the - sign corresponds to the attractor of the
system. If we calculate the attractor with the parameters
Gg, Gi and Gp founded at the data we get f = 0, 40 ±
0, 03. By the other hand, if we calculate the average of
the cooperation rate over the rounds 10-15 (rounds that
are very near of the stationary state on our model) we
get a value of f = 0, 46± 0, 03.
Figure 5. Here we represented the stationary value of
the cooperation rate in function of B, for different values
of Gi
We can see from the equation (5) that for positive
values of B we get a cooperation rate of less than 0.5,
but for negative values of B we get a cooperation rate
of more than 0.5. This explain why at the game zones
1-4 (B > 0) we get less cooperation than at the game
zone 5 (where B < 0), as we can see at figure 6.
Figure 6. Cooperation rate as function of S and T
parameters, calculated from the data (left) and from the
equation(5) (right).
C. Computational analysis and phenotype
emergence
We are going to make now a computational analysis
of our system. For that we simulated N=100000 indi-
viduals, that played 15 rounds, every round with some
other random opponent. Every individual have the same
values of Gg, Gi and Gp. If we fix at 0.6, 0.3, and 0.2 the
parameters Gg, Gi and Gp respectively we get the figure
7, where we represented the cooperation rate per round.
Figure 7. Cooperation rate per round, simulated and
modelized (left), and calculated from the data (right).
As we said at the introduction there are five types
or phenotypes of players, each one characterized by its
actions in function of the S and T parameters. We are
going to see how our model can explain the emergence
Treball de Fi de Grau 3 Barcelona, June 2016
TITLE Student’s name
of the envious and trustful phenotypes (optimist an
pessimist phenotypes can’t be explained with our model,
since we assumed that the actions between different
game zones are not correlated). For that we made
the same simulation as before but using the values of
table III for the parameters Gg, Gi and Gp, so we can
represent the cooperation rate in function of S and
T parameters. Also, a 10 per cent of the population
have the Gg and Gp exchanged, representing the
trustful players. In figure 8 we can see how the envious
and trustful patterns emerge as the game progresses.
Figure 8. Emergence of the phenotypes envious (up)
and trustful (down).
III. CONCLUSIONS
We are going to conclude this work with three conclu-
sions about the experiment:
• First of all, we had seen that in this game the ma-
jor part of the population tends to imitate the be-
haviour of the opponent when this one gets more
reward than the subject, with a small fraction of
the population (around the 0.1) with the opposite
behaviour.
• The first conclusion leads to the second one: as the
game progresses the cooperation rate of the popu-
lation decreases until it reaches an stationary value.
• This kind of behaviour can explain the emergence
of the trustful and envious phenotypes, as we had
seen in figure 10. This model it is also compati-
ble with the emergence of the clueless phenotype,
since these players have a higher value of Gi, as
we can see at table II, and that means more ran-
dom actions, which is precisely the characteristics
of clueless players.
Finally, we are going to make some observations for
future research’s. We had seen at figure 6 that the differ-
ence Gg-Gp increases with the difference T-S. It would be
interesting to study in greater depth the relation between
these parameters. It will also be interesting to find out
how the optimist and pessimist phenotypes emerges in
this game. One finally observation is that in this experi-
ment the players never knew who player against, and this
could be the reason of the decreasing cooperation rate.
It would be interesting to find out how people behaves
when they know their opponent.
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